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While public discussion of HR 2454 (the “Waxman Markey” bill) has focused on the cap-andtrade
program that would be established for carbon emissions, the bill also includes provisions that would
tighten energy efficiency standards for consumer appliances. Supporters argue that appliance standards
help address a number of market failures. In particular, many studies have pointed out that landlords
may buy cheap inefficient appliances when their tenants pay the utility bill. Although this landlord-tenant
problem has been widely discussed in the literature, there is little empirical evidence on the magnitude
of the distortion. This paper compares appliance ownership patterns between homeowners and renters
using household-level data from the Residential Energy Consumption Survey. The results show that,
controlling for household income and other household characteristics, renters are significantly less
likely to have energy efficient refrigerators, clothes washers and dishwashers.
Lucas W. Davis





While public discussion of HR 2454 (the “Waxman Markey” bill) has focused on the cap-and-
trade program that would be established for carbon emissions, the bill also includes provisions that
would tighten energy eﬃciency standards for consumer appliances. Appliance standards have been
used in the United States since the 1970s and currently standards are in place for dozens of diﬀerent
appliance types. There is an important tradeoﬀ inherent with standards. A standard truncates the
market, removing goods that are preferred by some buyers. This cost must be balanced against
potential beneﬁts. In particular, supporters of standards argue that they help address a number of
market failures that would not be addressed by a cap-and-trade program alone.
One frequently discussed example is the landlord-tenant problem. Many studies have pointed
out that landlords may buy cheap ineﬃcient appliances when their tenants pay the utility bill.
Although investments in energy eﬃcient appliances could, in theory, be passed on in the form of
higher rents, it may be diﬃcult for landlords to eﬀectively convey information about the eﬃciency
characteristics of appliances. Landlords have an incentive to inform tenants about energy eﬃcient
appliances. However, it may be diﬃcult for tenants to evaluate these claims because most tenants
are not experienced in evaluating the energy eﬃciency of appliances. Moreover, old energy bills are
typically of limited value in evaluating claims from landlords because appliance utilization varies
across households.
The landlord-tenant problem and other principal-agent problems are important to consider when
designing carbon policy. Cap-and-trade programs work by increasing the price of energy, causing
agents to internalize the social damages from their choices. Principal-agent problems reduce the
eﬀectiveness of this approach because the person experiencing these increased prices may not be
the same person who is making decisions about energy use. For example, landlords may continue
to purchase ineﬃcient appliances even as their tenants’ energy bills increase. In short, it may not
be enough to simply put a price on carbon and the presence of principal-agent problems in addition
to environmental externalities may justify combining appliance standards with cap-and-trade.
The landlord-tenant problem has been widely discussed in the literature (see, e.g. Blumstein,
Krieg, and Schipper, 1980; Fisher and Rothkopf, 1989; Jaﬀe and Stavins, 1994; Nadel, 2002; and
Gillingham, Newell and Palmer, 2009), but its practical importance has yet to be determined
empirically. Understanding the mechanisms that explain this behavior and the magnitude of the
distortion is important for determining how to most eﬀectively target policies.
1This paper compares appliance ownership patterns between homeowners and renters using
household-level data from a nationally-representative survey, the Residential Energy Consump-
tion Survey. The results show that renters are signiﬁcantly less likely to report having energy
eﬃcient refrigerators, clothes washers, and dishwashers. Diﬀerences are large in magnitude and
remain after controlling for household income, demographics, energy prices, weather, and other
controls. The results imply nationwide an annual increase in energy consumption of approximately
nine trillion btus, equivalent to 165,000 tons of carbon emissions annually.
The paper focuses on a set of appliances which together represent about one-fourth of energy
consumption in rental housing units.1 There is reason to believe, however, that the other three-
fourths (mostly heating and cooling) is also subject to the landlord-tenant problem. The agency
issues with building energy eﬃciency may actually be worse than with appliances. Although it is
relatively easy to verify that a dishwasher is energy eﬃcient, it requires considerably more expertise
to verify investments in, e.g. roof insulation or heating and cooling ductwork. Given pending
legislation aimed at weatherization, an important priority for future work is to examine directly
this broader class of energy eﬃcient investments.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides relevant background information about energy
eﬃciency standards in the United States and describes the data. Section 3 describes the estimating
equation used to test for diﬀerences in appliance ownership patterns between homeowners and
renters. Results are presented and discussed. Section 4 calculates the total energy consumption,
expenditure, and carbon emissions implied by the estimates and Section 5 concludes.
2 Background and Data
Under the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975 the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)
is required to establish energy eﬃciency standards for refrigerators, room air conditioners, clothes
washers, dishwashers, and a broad class of additional residential appliances. Standards are period-
ically revised as warranted by technological improvements. Most recently, the Energy Policy Act
of 2005, the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, and HR 2454 (the “Waxman Markey”
bill) include provisions regarding energy eﬃciency standards for residential appliances.2
1U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), 2005 Residential Energy Consumption Survey, “Total Energy Consumption,
Expenditures, and Intensities”, Table US12.
2See Nadel (2002) and U.S. Department of Energy (2009), “Code of Federal Regulations, Energy Conservation
Program for Consumer Products, Energy and Water Conservation Standards and Their Eﬀective Dates, 430.32” for
more information about appliance eﬃciency standards in the United States.
2Since 1992 the Department of Energy in cooperation with the Environmental Protection Agency
has, in addition, maintained a set of more stringent standards called “Energy Star” standards.
Appliances exceeding these standards are among the most energy eﬃcient in a particular class
and receive an Energy Star label that is prominently displayed on the appliance at the time of
purchase. Participation in the Energy Star program is voluntary though in practice all appliance
manufacturers choose to participate. Similar programs are used in Australia, Canada, Japan, New
Zealand, Taiwan and the European Union. In addition, many utilities oﬀer rebates for households
that purchase Energy Star appliances and the DOE recently committed $300 million in funding for
rebates for qualiﬁed Energy Star appliances.3
This paper examines the saturation of Energy Star appliances using household-level data from
the 2005 Residential Energy Consumption Survey (RECS), a nationally-representative in-home
survey conducted approximately every ﬁve years by the Department of Energy. The RECS provides
detailed information about the appliances used in the home as well as information about the
demographic characteristics of the household, the housing unit itself, weather characteristics, and
energy prices. In addition, RECS reports state of residence for households living in New York,
California, Florida and Texas, and Census division for all other households. The RECS is a national
area-probability sample survey and RECS sampling weights are used throughout the analysis.
RECS also provides detailed information on who pays for utilities. The main results exclude
households whose utilities are included in the rent. In the 2005 RECS sample, this includes 13.4
percent of all renters (4.2 percent of all households). These households do not pay directly for
energy and thus tend to use their appliances more intensively.4 In addition, the incentives for the
adoption of energy eﬃcient technologies are very diﬀerent. Paying utilities themselves, landlords
in these housing units have more incentive to invest in energy eﬃcient appliances.
Beginning in 2005 households in the RECS were asked whether or not their major appliances
were Energy Star.5 These questions are somewhat unusual. Although many surveys ask about
appliance ownership (e.g. American Community Survey), nationally-representative surveys typi-
3Department of Energy, “Secretary Chu Announces Nearly $300 Million Rebate Program to Encourage Purchases
of energy eﬃcient Appliances,” Press Release, July 14, 2009.
4Levinson and Niemann (2004) use RECS data to test whether energy use is higher in apartments where utilities
are included in the rent. Controlling for observable characteristics of households, they ﬁnd that tenants in apartments
where utilities are included set their thermostats between one and three degrees (Fahrenheit) warmer during winter
months when they are not at home.
5Earlier RECS surveys do not ask about appliance energy eﬃciency. The 2001 RECS does include a question
about whether your clothes washer is front loading or top loading. However, in 2001 front loading clothes washers
were still relatively unusual in the United States, representing only 3.0 percent of all clothes washers in the RECS
sample. See DOE, “2001 Residential Energy Consumption Survey: Housing Characteristics Tables”, Table HC5-4a.
3cally do not elicit information about energy eﬃciency. The question was asked for refrigerators,
dishwashers, room air conditioners, and clothes washers and households were shown an Energy
Star label when answering the question. Households with appliances more than 10 years old were
assumed not to have Energy Star appliances and were not asked the question.
With any self-reported information there is reason to be concerned about accuracy.6 Perhaps
most problematic for this analysis, it would seem reasonable to believe that homeowners may
be better informed than renters about whether or not their appliances are Energy Star. This
could provide an alternative explanation for the ﬁnding that homeowners are more likely to report
having Energy Star appliances. In light of these concerns, the following analysis also examines
two alternative measures of energy eﬃciency. Results are generally similar for these alternative
measures, suggesting that the results are not entirely driven by misreporting.
First, in addition to asking whether or not a household’s clothes washer is Energy Star, RECS
asks if the clothes washer is “front loading” or “top loading”. As described in detail in Davis (2008),
front-loading clothes washers tumble clothes on a horizontal axis through a pool of water at the
bottom of the tub, using about 50 percent less energy per cycle than conventional washers. Thus
“front loading” is an excellent proxy for energy eﬃciency and, importantly, whether the clothes
washer is front loading is likely to be salient to both homeowners and renters.
Second, results are reported for energy eﬃcient lighting. After asking how many lights the
household typically uses the survey asks, “How many of these lights use energy eﬃcient bulbs? An
energy eﬃcient bulb is a ﬂuorescent tube or a compact ﬂuorescent bulb that costs more than a
regular bulb but is one that lasts much longer.” The measure used in the analysis is whether or
not the household reports having any energy eﬃcient light bulbs though results are similar for the
percentage of light bulbs that are energy eﬃcient.
6The fraction Energy Star in the RECS corresponds poorly to fraction Energy Star in appliance sales data from
DOE. For example, in the RECS among households with appliances less than four years old the percentage of
households who report owning an Energy Star appliance is 58 percent for refrigerators, 63 percent for dishwashers,
30 percent for room air-conditioners, and 59 percent for clothes washers. In contrast, the DOE reports that the
percentage Energy Star among appliances sold in 2005 was 33 percent for refrigerators, 82 percent for dishwashers,
52 percent for room air-conditioners, and 36 percent for clothes washers. These percentages are based on sales data
reported to DOE by retail partners. DOE warns users that the set of retail partners changes from year to year, and
urges caution in using these data, particularly for making comparisons across years.
43 Results
3.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics. The ﬁrst two columns report mean household charac-
teristics for homeowners and renters. The ﬁnal column reports p-values from tests that the means
in the subsamples are equal. The table reveals pronounced diﬀerences between homeowners and
renters. Homeowners have substantially higher annual household income, are less likely to receive
welfare beneﬁts, are older, are less likely to be non-white, and are more likely to live in suburban
and rural areas. In addition, appliance saturation levels diﬀer substantially with homeowners more
likely to have clothes washers and dishwashers but less likely to have room air conditioners.
Energy eﬃcient technologies are described near the bottom of Table 1. Homeowners are sig-
niﬁcantly more likely to report having energy eﬃcient refrigerators, dishwashers, clothes washers,
and lighting. Diﬀerences range from seven percentage points for refrigerators to eleven percentage
points for clothes washers. Particularly striking are the means for front loading clothes washers.
Nine percent of homeowners report having a front loading washer compared to only two percent for
renters. For room air conditioners the pattern is reversed, with more renters reporting Energy Star
units. This primarily reﬂects the higher saturation levels of room air conditioners among renters.
In addition, room air conditioners are somewhat diﬀerent because they are often owned by renters.
Whereas it would be unusual for a tenant to install his/her own refrigerator or clothes washer in a
rental unit, room air conditioners are relatively portable and can be easily installed.
Comparison of means provides an important baseline. However, it is diﬃcult to draw strong
conclusions on the basis of the evidence in Table 1. Although the diﬀerences for energy eﬃcient
technologies are consistent with the landlord-tenant problem, this pattern could also be driven by
other factors such as household income that are correlated with homeownership. The analysis that
follows adopts a regression framework, comparing the saturation of energy eﬃcient technologies
between homeowners and renters while controlling for household income and other household char-
acteristics. It is worth emphasizing that although the means for many of the characteristics are
very diﬀerent, there is a fair degree of overlap between homeowners and renters. Consider house-
hold income, for example. Although mean annual household income is very diﬀerent ($55,700 for
homeowners compared to $34,200 for renters) there are a reasonable number of renters (291 out
of 1219) with household income higher than the median household income for homeowners, and a
reasonable number of homeowners (895 out of 2979) with household income lower than the median
5household income for renters. This lends credibility to the regression framework and its ability to
eﬀectively control for the observable diﬀerences between groups.
3.2 Regression Results
Table 2 presents estimates from a linear probability model of the following form,
yi = β0 + β11(renter) + β2Xi + i.
The dependent variable yi is an indicator variable equal to one if the household reports having a
particular energy eﬃcient technology. For example, in the ﬁrst row the dependent variable is an
indicator variable for households with an Energy Star refrigerator. The table report the estimated
coeﬃcient and standard error corresponding to 1(renter), an indicator variable for renters. The
coeﬃcient of interest β1 is the diﬀerence in Energy Star appliance saturation between renters and
homeowners with a negative coeﬃcient indicating that renters are less likely to have an energy
eﬃcient model. Households who do not have a particular technology type are excluded from the
regression so the sample size varies across rows from 4,198 (all households) for lighting to 1,184 for
room air conditioners.
Table 2 reports estimates of β1 from four diﬀerence speciﬁcations ranging from no controls
in column (1) to the complete vector of covariates Xi in column (4) including household income
(cubic), household demographics including indicators for whether the household head is employed
and whether the household receives welfare beneﬁts, indicator variables for 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6+
household members, the age of the household head, and indicators for whether the household
has children and whether the household head is non-white, as well as electricity prices (cubic),
heating and cooling degree days (cubics), Census division, and available state indicators. One of
the important reasons why it is important to control for these household characteristics is that
homeowners and renters may diﬀer in the level of utilization of appliances. Households with high
utilization levels have more to gain from adoption of energy eﬃcient technologies (Hausman and
Joskow, 1982) because the savings are larger.
Consider ﬁrst the estimates for refrigerators. In column (1) without controls, renters are 6.7
percentage points less likely to report having energy eﬃcient refrigerators. This diﬀerence is iden-
tical to the diﬀerence in sample means in Table 1. Controlling for household income decreases the
point estimate corresponding to 1(renter), consistent with high-income households being both more
6likely to be homeowners and more likely to own energy eﬃcient refrigerators. Adding additional
controls in columns (3) and (4) increases the point estimates to 5.6 and then back to 6.7 percentage
points.
For dishwashers without controls the diﬀerence is 10.0 percentage points. This is relatively large
compared to the sample mean of 25 percent. As with refrigerators, the point estimate decreases
after adding income and then increases again after adding additional controls. Homeowners tend
to be older, face lower electricity prices, and live in rural and suburban areas; all characteristics
that tend to decrease the probability that a household reports having energy eﬃcient appliances.
Estimates for room air conditioners and clothes washers are also negative though consistently
smaller than the coeﬃcients for refrigerators and dishwashers. As mentioned above, room air
conditioners are relatively portable, potentially mitigating the landlord-tenant problem. Point
estimates for front loading clothes washers are negative, precisely estimated, and large relative to
the sample mean of eight percent. Finally, the estimate for lighting in the full speciﬁcation is 4.9
percentage points, compared to the somewhat larger sample mean of 39 percent. With lighting it
is relatively easy for a tenant to move into a rental unit and replace incandescent light bulbs with
energy eﬃcient light bulbs. On the other hand, the cost savings from energy eﬃcient lighting are
accrued over many years and there may be moving costs or other factors that prevent renters from
taking energy eﬃcient light bulbs with them with them when they move.
3.3 Discussion of Alternative Possible Explanations
These results demonstrate a consistent pattern of renters being less likely to report having energy
eﬃcient technologies. Although these results are consistent with the landlord-tenant problem, it is
important to consider possible alternative explanations.
First, the diﬀerences could reﬂect landlords choosing not to invest in energy eﬃcient technologies
because appliances may have a shorter lifespan in renter occupied units. Because they do not
own the appliances, renters may treat appliances more roughly (e.g. slamming doors, breaking
refrigerator shelves) increasing the wear and tear on appliances eventually leading to them needing
to be replaced. If this behavior is prevalent, landlords would then eﬃciently choose less expensive
appliances. Similarly, landlords may be concerned about possible theft of appliances. This might
be particularly problematic for lighting, with expensive light bulbs likely to disappear when renters
move out.
Second, the diﬀerences could reﬂect unobserved diﬀerences between homeowners and renters in
7taste for green products. Suppose that, controlling for observables, homeowners receive a warm glow
from using an energy eﬃcient technology but renters do not. Alternatively, it could be that con-
trolling for observables, homeowners have stronger tastes for certain appliance characteristics that
are correlated with energy eﬃciency. These diﬀerences in taste could lead landlords to eﬃciently
invest less in energy eﬃcient technologies. For tastes to explain these ﬁndings, this preference for
“green” would need to be imperfectly correlated with household income and other control variables,
and positively correlated with home ownership.
The following subsection reports the results from alternative speciﬁcations aimed at evaluating
these and other possible alternative explanations. Many of these speciﬁcations add additional
controls, and, for the most part, the basic pattern of renters being less likely to have energy
eﬃcient technologies is not sensitive to the addition of these controls. Although it is impossible
to deﬁnitively rule out possible alternative explanations, the fact that the results are robust across
alternative speciﬁcations lends support to the interpretation of these estimates as evidence of the
landlord-tenant problem.
3.4 Alternative Speciﬁcations
Table 3 reports results from the baseline speciﬁcation and 13 alternative speciﬁcations. The
dependent variable is indicated in the top of each column. For example, in column (1) the dependent
variable is an indicator variable equal to one if the household has an Energy Star refrigerator. All
speciﬁcations control for household income (cubic) and other household demographics, as well as
electricity prices (cubic), heating and cooling degrees (cubics), Census division, and available state
indicators as in column (4) of Table 2.
Row (A) reports the baseline speciﬁcation. For row (B) the model is estimated using a logit
model. Average marginal eﬀects are reported and are very similar to the baseline estimates. Row
(C) excludes households that “don’t know” if their appliance is Energy Star. In the baseline
speciﬁcation these households are treated as not having Energy Star appliances, and this choice
does not seem to be driving the results. Relatively few households answer “don’t know” and
the fraction is similar for homeowners and renters. For example, for refrigerators 4.0 percent of
homeowners and 5.3 percent of renters answer “don’t know”.
Rows (D-F) restrict the sample to households with relatively new appliances. Again results
are similar to the baseline speciﬁcation, suggesting that the results are not driven by diﬀerences
in appliance age between homeowners and renters. If anything, the point estimates tend to grow
8larger (in absolute value) as one restricts the sample to relatively newer appliances.
Rows (G) and (H) report estimates separately for renters below and above the mean level
of annual household income for renters. Estimated coeﬃcients are similar for both groups and
overwhelmingly negative, providing mild evidence against the “green tastes” explanation. If we
thought that the results were driven by taste for green products that is imperfectly correlated with
household income, one would have expected smaller estimated coeﬃcients for high-income renters.
Row (I) reports estimates for renters whose utilities are included in the rent. Point estimates are
negative and statistically signiﬁcant for refrigerators, room air conditioners, and clothes washers.
This is somewhat surprising because landlords in these units are paying utilities and thus have
incentive to invest in energy eﬃciency. Still, it is important to keep in mind that these households
are a somewhat unusual and unrepresentative group, overwhelmingly living in smaller apartments
in older multi-unit buildings. Those that do have refrigerators and clothes washers are more likely
to have smaller apartment-sized models where energy eﬃciency options are more limited.
Row (J) restricts the sample to multi-unit buildings and row (K) controls for housing char-
acteristics including the age of the housing unit, an indicator variable for multi-unit, number of
bedrooms, number of total rooms, and total square feet. These characteristics help proxy for life-
time wealth. Brueckner and Rosenthal (2009), for example, points out that newer houses tend to be
owned by high-income households and that over time neighborhoods with an older housing stock
tend to attract lower-income households. The point estimates are similar with these additional
controls.
Row (L) controls for self-reported measures of utilization. For dishwashers and clothes washers,
RECS asks households to report the number of loads a household typically does in a week. For
air-conditioning and lighting utilization is assessed by asking about the number of hours typically
used per day. Adding the self-reported measures of utilization does little to the estimates. This is
perhaps not surprising because the household characteristics already included in the regressions are
important determinants of utilization levels. For the baseline speciﬁcation it is better to exclude
these self-reported measures because utilization is a function of energy eﬃciency. As discussed
in Davis (2008), energy eﬃcient technologies lower the cost of utilization, potentially leading to
increased utilization.
Row (M) excludes households who receive energy assistance. In the RECS 4.4 percent of house-
holds receive some public aid. The largest such program, the Low Income Home Energy Assistance
Program (LIHEAP) has been in operation in the United States since 1982 and operates in all 50
9states with a $4.5 billion dollar budget in 2009. Eligible household must meet income requirements
and typically assistance is awarded on a ﬁrst come-ﬁrst served basis. For households facing subsi-
dized electricity rates, it makes sense that landlords would not make costly investments in energy
eﬃciency and it is reassuring that the results do not change when excluding these households.
Finally, row (N) excludes households in urban areas in California and New York. Where the
rental housing market is subject to rent control, landlords are constrained from making costly
investments in energy eﬃciency because there is no scope for these investments to be capitalized
into rents. Rent control is relatively uncommon in the United States, though several urban areas
in California and New York have rent controls for some units and it is interesting to see that the
results do not change when households in these areas are excluded.
4 Evaluating the Implied Total Cost
An appealing feature of the estimates in Section 3 is that they provide some of the information
necessary to evaluate the overall magnitude of the landlord-tenant problem for an important group
of household technologies. This section illustrates how these estimates can be applied, under
simpliﬁed assumptions, to infer the implied total energy consumption, expenditure, and carbon
emissions from the landlord-tenant problem. This preliminary assessment indicates that the total
cost of this market failure is not negligible, but that it is small relative to total energy consumption
in rental housing units.
Table 4 reports the total cost of the landlord-tenant problem as implied by the estimates in
the baseline speciﬁcation. These results are calculated using average annual energy consumption
and energy expenditure for Energy Star appliances from Sanchez, et. al (2008).7 The thought
experiment is to consider how many additional energy eﬃcient appliances there would be in the
United States if renters were equally likely as homeowners to have these technologies.
The estimates imply that if renters were equally likely to have energy eﬃcient appliances, in
the United States there would be 2.2 million more Energy Star refrigerators, 3.1 million more
Energy Star dishwashers, and 6.3 million more energy eﬃcient light bulbs.8 The estimates imply
7Sanchez, et al. (2008, Table 5) reports annual energy savings per Energy Star unit of 0.85 Mbtu ($7.59) for
refrigerators (15 percent), 1.17 Mbtu ($11.45) for dishwashers (29 percent), 0.68 Mbtu ($6.05) for room air conditioners
(10 percent), and 1.32 Mbtu ($12.23) for clothes washers (20 percent). Sanchez, et al. (2008, Table 6) reports that
these appliances generate between .015 and .018 tons of carbon per Mbtu depending on the types of energy (electricity,
natural gas, etc) used by each appliance. Energy eﬃcient light bulbs are assumed to use 15 watts, compared to 60
watts for conventional incandescent bulbs.
8In related work Murtishaw and Sathaye (2006) use data from the American Housing Survey to evaluate the scope
10smaller impacts for room air conditioners and clothes washers. Nationwide this would reduce
annual energy consumption by 9.4 trillion btus, reduce annual energy expenditures by 93 million,
and reduce annual carbon emissions by 166,000 tons.
To put this in perspective, this is about 1/2 of one percent of total energy consumption in rental
housing units.9 There are several reasons why this is not a larger fraction. First, in this thought
experiment the saturation of energy eﬃcient technologies is increasing by only between one and
nine percentage points. Although not negligible, this is very diﬀerent from assuming, for example,
comprehensive replacement of all conventional appliances with energy eﬃcient appliances. Second,
these end-uses represent only about one-fourth of total energy expenditure in rental housing units.10
Third, these calculations assume that energy eﬃcient technologies use between 10 percent and 30
percent less energy than conventional technologies. The one exception is lighting, for which savings
are larger.
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper provides one of the ﬁrst empirical analyses of the landlord-tenant problem. Across
speciﬁcations, the estimates indicate that renters are signiﬁcantly less likely to have energy eﬃcient
refrigerators, clothes washers, dishwashers, and lighting. Taken literally, the estimates imply nine
trillion btus of excess energy consumption annually in the United States. More research and better
data are needed to fully evaluate this problem. The new questions in the RECS are a step in the
right direction, but more information is needed including results from professional energy audits
to assess potential problems about the accuracy of the self-reported measures of energy eﬃciency.
In future work, it would also be valuable to extend the analysis to a broader class of residential
energy eﬃciency investments including building insulation, windows, and heating equipment.
for principal-agent problems in residential refrigeration, water heating, space heating and lighting, concluding that
24 percent of residential energy consumption in the United States is potentially subject to principal-agent problems.
This study was part of an international project whose results are described in IEA (2007).
9According to DOE, “2005 Residential Energy Consumption Survey, Total Energy Consumption, Expenditures,
and Intensities”, Table US1, rental housing units in the United States used 2.39 quadrillion btus of energy in 2005.
10From DOE, “2005 Residential Energy Consumption Survey, Total Energy Consumption, Expenditures, and
Intensities”, Table US12, air-conditioners, refrigerators, lighting, and other appliances together represent 36 percent
of total energy consumption in rental housing units. Space and water heating represent the other 64 percent.
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Comparing Mean Household Characteristics of Homeowners and Renters
Homeowners Renters p-value
Household Economic Characteristics
Household Annual Income (1000s) 55.7 34.2 .00
Proportion Household Head Employed 0.90 0.88 .08
Proportion Welfare 0.06 0.24 .00
Household Demographics
Household Size (persons) 2.60 2.57 .69
Age of Household Head 52.7 42.2 .00
Proportion with Children 0.34 0.38 .10
Proportion Household Head Non-White 0.21 0.44 .00
Type of Neighborhood
Urban 0.36 0.57 .00
Town 0.16 0.19 .14
Suburban 0.23 0.14 .00
Rural 0.25 0.10 .00
Climate and Electricity Prices
Annual Cooling Degree Days (1000s) 1.58 1.61 .64
Annual Heating Degree Days (1000s) 4.15 3.82 .09
Electricity Prices (cents per kwh) 10.3 11.1 .09
Appliance Saturation
Refrigerator 1.00 1.00 .95
Dishwasher 0.67 0.39 .00
Room Air Conditioner 0.21 0.38 .01
Clothes Washer 0.95 0.57 .00
Energy Eﬃcient Technologies
Energy Star Refrigerator 0.24 0.17 .00
Energy Star Dishwasher 0.18 0.07 .00
Energy Star Room Air Conditioner 0.04 0.05 .01
Energy Star Clothes Washer 0.23 0.12 .00
Front Loading Clothes Washer 0.09 0.02 .00
Energy Eﬃcient Lighting (any) 0.41 0.33 .01
Sample Size 2979 1219
Implied Number of Households (millions) 77.8 28.6
Note: This table describes households in the 2005 Residential Energy Consumption Survey.
Means are computed using RECS sampling weights. The ﬁnal column reports p-values (cluster-
ing by Census division) from tests that the means in the subsamples are equal. Some households
have more than one refrigerator or room air conditioner, and the table reports whether or not
the most used unit is Energy Star. The survey questions about clothes washers are careful to
exclude community clothes washers located in, for example, the basement or laundry room of
an apartment building.
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Are Renters Less Likely to Have Energy Eﬃcient Appliances?
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Energy Star Refrigerator [Sample Mean = .22] -.067 -.034 -.056 -.067
(.014) (.017) (.015) (.015)
Energy Star Dishwasher [Sample Mean = .25] -.100 -.073 -.086 -.095
(.024) (.024) (.033) (.036)
Energy Star Room Air Conditioner [Sample Mean = .16] -.032 -.016 -.018 -.009
(.011) (.016) (.016) (.023)
Energy Star Clothes Washer [Sample Mean = .23] -.030 -.002 -.027 -.033
(.014) (.016) (.017) (.014)
Front Loading Clothes Washer [Sample Mean = .08] -.054 -.032 -.028 -.031
(.007) (.004) (.005) (.005)
Energy Eﬃcient Lighting [Sample Mean = .39] -.075 -.038 -.046 -.049
(.023) (.026) (.031) (.024)
Household Income (Cubic) no yes yes yes
Household Demographics no no yes yes
Electricity Prices (Cubic) no no no yes
Heating and Cooling Degree Days (Cubics) no no no yes
Census Division and Available State Indicators no no no yes
Note: This table reports estimated coeﬃcients corresponding to an indicator for renter from 24
separate regressions, all estimated using least squares with RECS sampling weights. For each
regression the dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one if the household has
the energy eﬃcient technology indicated in the row heading. Standard errors (in parentheses)
are robust to heteroskedasticity and arbitrary correlation within Census divisions.
14Table 3
Are Renters Less Likely to Have Energy Eﬃcient Technologies? Alternative Speciﬁcations
Energy Star Energy Star Front Loading Energy
Energy Star Energy Star Room Air Clothes Clothes Eﬃcient
Refrigerator Dishwasher Conditioner Washer Washer Lighting
[mean=.22] [mean=.25] [mean=.16] [mean=.23] [mean=.08] [mean=.39]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(A) Baseline Speciﬁcation -.067 -.095 -.009 -.033 -.031 -.049
(.015) (.036) (.023) (.014) (.005) (.024)
(B) Logit Model -.071 -.103 -.011 -.033 -.044 -.050
(.015) (.038) (.022) (.016) (.006) (.025)
(C) Excluding “don’t know” -.071 -.106 -.014 -.040 NA NA
(.016) (.037) (.025) (.016)
(D) Among Households with -.080 -.094 -.009 -.021 -.039 NA
Appliances < 10 years old (.020) (.037) (.037) (.017) (.011)
(E) Among Households with -.140 -.124 -.020 -.071 -.066 NA
Appliances < 5 years old (.029) (.047) (.049) (.032) (.017)
(F) Among Households with -.120 -.100 -.012 -.018 -.079 NA
Appliances < 2 years old (.037) (.062) (.019) (.050) (.033)
(G) Low Income Renters Only -.066 -.054 -.013 -.027 -.001 -.027
(.021) (.037) (.021) (.027) (.013) (.014)
(H) High Income Renters Only -.047 -.102 .001 -.032 -.055 -.060
(.027) (.038) (.027) (.014) (.013) (.037)
(I) Renters with Utilities Included -.074 .004 -.100 -.150 -.050 -.001
(.018) (.044) (.036) (.044) (.011) (.041)
(J) Among Households Living in -.064 -.041 -.006 -.074 -.032 -.026
Multi-Unit Buildings (.027) (.083) (.046) (.108) (.019) (.055)
(K) Including Housing -.038 -.071 .005 -.033 -.031 -.040
Characteristics (.015) (.042) (.013) (.012) (.008) (.028)
(L) Including Self-Reported NA -.095 -.009 -.031 -.031 -.045
Utilization (.036) (.023) (.014) (.005) (.024)
(M) Excluding Households Who -.077 -.101 -.017 -.030 -.033 -.047
Receive Energy Assistance (.017) (.035) (.023) (.015) (.005) (.020)
(N) Excluding Cities With -.066 -.086 -.026 -.032 -.026 -.059
Rent Control (NY, CA) (.017) (.033) (.031) (.014) (.005) (.015)
Note: This table reports estimated coeﬃcients corresponding to an indicator for renter from 79 separate regressions, all estimated
using least squares with RECS sampling weights. For each regression the dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to
one of the household has the energy eﬃcient technology indicated in the column heading. All speciﬁcations control for household
income (cubic) and other household demographics, as well as electricity prices (cubic), heating and cooling degrees (cubics),
Census division, and available state indicators as in column (4) of Table 2. Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to
heteroskedasticity and arbitrary correlation within Census divisions.
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The Implied Total Cost of the Landlord-Tenant Problem
Room Air Clothes All Technologies
Refrigerators Dishwashers Conditioners Washers Light Bulbs Combined
Total Units in millions 2.2 3.1 0.3 1.1 6.3 13.1
(0.5) (1.2) (0.8) (0.5) (3.2) (3.6)
Annual Energy Consumption 1.9 3.7 0.2 1.4 2.1 9.4
in btus, trillions (0.4) (1.4) (0.5) (0.6) (1.1) (2.1)
Annual Expenditure on Energy 17.8 37.9 1.9 13.9 20.1 92.9
in 2009 dollars, millions (4.1) (14.4) (4.8) (6.1) (10.3) (20.0)
Annual Carbon Emissions 34.0 65.9 3.6 21.3 38.3 165.8
in metric tons, thousands (7.7) (25.0) (9.2) (9.3) (19.6) (35.7)
Note: This table reports the total cost of the landlord-tenant problem as implied by the estimated coeﬃcients in column (4) of
Table 2. Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to heteroskedasticity and arbitrary correlation within Census divisions.
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